Rebooted with U.S. help

There have been many explanations as to why Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched a new round of talks with Pakistan, abandoning the several conditions that had stalled the bilateral engagement. But no account of the turnaround has adequately accounted for what has been happening between the U.S. and Pakistan over the last two months and how it may have influenced the Indian repositioning. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan army chief Raheel Sharif visited the U.S. in October and November respectively. A joint statement by President Barack Obama and PM Sharif, a background briefing provided to Indian journalists by a senior U.S. administration official and, most recently, a House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing of U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Olson on December 16, give one a sense of how the U.S. sees Pakistan, and the implications for India.

Redrawing the redlines

Until the recent turnaround, India followed the pre-election rhetoric of the current government leaders that India would unilaterally set the terms of engagement with Pakistan. On February 21, 2014, months before he became the National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval said: “If you know the trick, we know the tricks better than you. If you do another Mumbai, you lose Balochistan.” He added that “defensive offence” would be the approach towards Pakistan, which entailed working on the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and isolating it internationally. While the media took note of Mr. Doval’s earlier positions when he became the NSA — in Pakistan with a sense of unease and in India with characteristic jingoism — there was no official attempt to undo it. On the contrary, fresh statements — by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar in the context of dealing with terrorism, that India would “remove a thorn with another thorn”; by Minister of State Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore that the Indian cross-border operation in Myanmar in June was a message to Pakistan; by Mr. Doval that India would “convince Pakistan in the language it understands” — only added to the mystery of India’s Pakistan policy. Incidentally, “talking to Pakistan in the language that it understands” was a favourite one-liner of Mr. Modi throughout the 2014 election campaign. A joke in Washington goes that a dossier that Pakistan PM Sharif gave to President Obama as “evidence” of India promoting terrorism in Pakistan was only a compilation of such speeches!

In restarting talks with Pakistan, India has abandoned the redlines that were drawn recently, mainly the position that Kashmir was not a bilateral issue and Pakistan could not engage the Kashmiri separatist leaders.

Pakistan as a key partner

The U.S.-Pakistan joint statement had referred to terrorism as a subject of mutual concern, lending credence to Pakistan’s position that India has been fomenting trouble in Balochistan.

The official who spoke to Indian reporters explained that since both countries were accusing each other of terrorism, the best way to resolve the issue was by talking to each other. Except this point about terrorism being a “mutual concern”, most other points of the background briefing were stated by Mr. Olson in the open hearing of the committee, forcefully defending the U.S. engagement with Pakistan, including the plan to sell more F-16 fighter jets to it. All members of the committee were vocal in questioning the administration’s approach, indicating a success of Indian diplomacy in reaching out to U.S. lawmakers. Many of them wanted specific assurance regarding the trial of the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack and action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). “We continue to press Pakistan about the need not just to ban the LeT but take action against it, particularly against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks,” said Mr. Olson, but he went on to remind lawmakers that U.S. disengagement with Pakistan in the 1990s had blinded it to developments in the region that would culminate in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. “Our national interest is to not allow Pakistan to disengage from us.”

Mr. Olson’s argument was that in combating Islamist terrorism, Pakistan was a key partner. He was candid about the Obama administration’s view on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): “ISI has a role to play with regard to Afghan reconciliation. The role that Pakistan played in bringing the Taliban to the table last summer was quite important. They need to do that again and there were positive statements at the Heart of Asia conference.”

He also fielded questions on securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from terrorists and its nuclear programme in general. “We are concerned by the pace and scope of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, particularly its pursuit of short-range nuclear systems. We are concerned that a conventional conflict in South Asia could escalate to use of nuclear weapons.” About Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into dangerous hands, Mr. Olson said: “We have confidence in the capability of the Pakistan security forces to secure their nuclear weapons. There is a clean-up from the situation that existed a decade ago.”

Stable Pakistan, stable South Asia

The U.S. also feels that Pakistan is better poised than ever before to deal with its internal challenges, and emphasises the fact that this is the first democratic government that succeeded a democratic government, has brought the economy back on track and has stabilised governance. The U.S. is also convinced that Pakistan’s attitude towards terrorism has changed after the Peshawar terror episode that targeted schoolchildren and the only remaining question is their ability — and the requirement — to do more against LeT and the Haqqani network.

The U.S. is clear that it is invested in “stabilising Pakistan”, and Mr. Olson detailed at some length the numerous initiatives it has taken to promote education, health care and governance there. “A major thrust of our assistance programme is regional connectivity… The new thaw in India-Pak. relations could lead to more trade in the region,” he said, after terming External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Islamabad as a significant upturn in relations.

Now, regional connectivity is a promise that the Modi government had held out, as enunciated by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar on July 20, 2015, at his IISS-Fullerton Lecture in Singapore. “To begin with, the approach to India’s neighbours has undergone a big shift, symbolised by the invitation extended to their leaders when the government was first sworn in. Since then, we have seen the themes of greater connectivity, stronger cooperation and broader contacts dominate India’s engagement with them.” But things soon went downhill, first with Pakistan as a result of the inexplicable new redlines, and then recently with Nepal, burying the ‘neighbourhood first’ outlook.

If India had continued its stand-off with Pakistan, it would have fallen foul of the U.S. strategy for South Asia, centring around stability in Afghanistan, securing the Pakistani nuclear arsenal from terrorists and stabilising Pakistan by integrating it with the regional economy. No explanation of India’s turnaround on Pakistan would be complete without accounting for this.

At Paris, something for everyone

The Agreement is about restricting temperature rise to 2 °C, but current pledges to reduce emissions may increase average global temperature by about 3 °C.

Representatives from 195 countries at the Conference of the Parties (COP-21) meeting in Paris have soldiered on in marathon sessions, working for close to two weeks, and prepared an international agreement that lays the foundation for future action by all countries to contain and respond to the planetary threat of climate change. The Paris Agreement is widely recognised as launching one of the most significant transformations in human interaction, technology and landscape.

Sudhir Chella Rajan & Sujatha Byravan

India played a significant role in the process, especially in safeguarding differentiation between rich and developing countries. Environment Minister Prakash Javadekar has expressed his satisfaction that India’s main concerns in all areas have been addressed in the Paris Pact.

The preparation of the text of the pact, itself an iterative process with bracketed words in interim drafts indicating language that still needed agreement, resulted in three versions of the document with each new one edging closer towards the last. Every country was required to approve the final text and the deal would have crashed even if a single Party disagreed. The final text seems to contain something for everyone, though not nearly enough to satisfy anyone fully.

Contentious issues

The main issues of contention have been differentiation, financial support, mitigation action and loss and damage.

These terms have been interpreted in the following way: maintaining the difference between rich and developing countries through the expression of Article 3 of the Convention, common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR); providing support for developing countries through finance, technology and capacity-building so they can reduce emissions and adapt to climate change impacts; determining whether all major emitters, rich and developing countries, should announce a date when their greenhouse gas emissions would peak; and supporting poor countries that experience loss and damage as a result of warming and deciding whether the language of ‘liability and compensation’ should be preserved.

One issue that was previously contentious and was mostly resolved in an interim draft concerns the average temperature rise that would be agreed upon as the target for the Convention. The demand of many vulnerable countries is that greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced to restrict warming to under 1.5 degrees Celsius. Article 2 of the Paris Agreement says that it is the objective of the Convention to limit increase in global average temperatures to “well below 2 degrees C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees C, recognising that this would significantly reduce risks and impacts of climate change”. Various estimates, however, indicate that current pledges and policies in the nationally determined contributions to reduce emissions are likely to increase the average global temperature by about 3 degrees Celsius as opposed to a business-as-usual rise of about 5 degrees by the end of the century.

The final text is divided into two main parts: the Agreement itself, which is seen as a durable set of overall commitments, and the Decision, which has many sections covering commitments across several themes and the institutional arrangements needed for implementation. Since both parts of the text have been signed in Paris, it is understood that the whole document will have legal force, although there is some expectation that elements of the Decision could be changed especially during the five-year reviews that are built in.

On the overall question of whether the Agreement maintains differentiation between developed and developing countries, several experts seem to provide a qualified answer in the affirmative. Many elements of differentiation are embedded in various parts of the agreement even if the language in the preamble itself is not as strong as was hoped for by many developing countries.

The language on differentiation (CBDR) has been expanded to include the term “in the light of different national circumstances”, which is likely to indicate that a previously strict firewall between developed and developing countries has been broken down. Also lost in the maelstrom is explicit acknowledgement of the historical responsibility of developed countries.

Nevertheless, the text also contains several provisions specifically indicating developed country obligations. For instance, Article 9 of the Agreement is quite explicit in calling for financial support from developed countries that is significantly derived from public funds, which “should represent a progression beyond previous efforts”. It is expected that this will result in at least $100 billion per year to address needs and priorities of developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. Furthermore, developed countries are required to provide transparent information on support to developing countries and biennially communicate their plans for mobilisation of additional finance.

On mitigation action, developed countries are required to take the lead in setting absolute emission reduction targets, but developing countries are “encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances”. Under “enhanced transparency framework”, all countries are required to provide updates on their nationally determined contributions every five years starting in 2020. There is no mention of a peaking year for developing countries, apart from the explicit recognition that it may take them much longer to start reducing their emissions in absolute terms.

The text calls for a comprehensive periodic review or “global stocktake” of the implementation of the Paris Agreement, covering all areas in a “facilitative manner” and “in the light of equity and the best available science”. Several commentators feel that this provision is important for reviewing progress in emissions reductions, technology transfer and finance, while also opening up the possibility for monitoring differentiation.

The importance of loss and damage has been recognised clearly in the text but there is also a clear demarcation in the Decision (though not in the Agreement) that this cannot be tied to liability and compensation. Without liability and compensation there will be no scope for victims of climate change to file legal claims, which implies that there is no guarantee that losses and damage associated with severe weather events directly as a consequence of climate change will receive monetary or non-monetary relief from entities that are identified as defendants.

Implications for India

Going forward, India will have to make considerable efforts to implement the new contours of the Agreement, especially the progressive review of goals, monitoring frameworks, and the revised wording of CBDR to consider national circumstances in the Paris Agreement. In particular, the way in which India’s “national circumstances” will be interpreted for financial flows, technology transfer, or capacity-building are not clear since India is a large country with high GDP and millions live in poverty. There are also harsh implications in terms of vulnerability and adaptation because of the severe impacts of climate change that we could expect if global average temperatures rise by 2 degrees or more.

Then, there is the issue of the sharing of remaining carbon space. If adequate mechanisms to ensure equitable sharing of the remaining development space are not introduced during the reviews, there could well be a race to the bottom where developed countries continue to swallow up the remaining carbon budget. In such circumstances, India would have to prepare itself to lift millions out of poverty while also claiming its rightful share of development space.

India will also need to be concerned about providing human services in a sustainable manner to its vast underserved population. But most of all it will require a domestic social and economic transformation of a scale and scope that has never been attempted before. While this is a challenge, it is also a tremendous opportunity for the country to demonstrate an alternative model of sustainable development: one in which development is delinked from total dependence on fossil fuels. If it succeeds, India could set an example for other developing countries.

A shift from style to substance

A data-driven analysis of Mr. Modi’s foreign policy interventions in his second year in office indicates no sharp disjuncture from the stated views of previous governments.

In the first half of his second year in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made 61 interventions on foreign policy, in the form of speeches, press releases, op-eds, media interactions, and community receptions. Nearly a quarter of these (14) were delivered in India, and the rest on visits abroad. During this period, Mr. Modi managed the unprecedented feat of addressing every major multilateral grouping — barring the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) — in which India is a member: the United Nations, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the G20 bloc, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the India-Africa Summit and the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation. Save Egypt and Indonesia, the last six months account for Mr. Modi’s engagement with almost every major leadership.

Arun Mohan Sukumar

Foreign policy interventions

Consequently, this period could help assess three questions on the National Democratic Alliance’s foreign policy. First, has the Prime Minister’s post-election rhetoric of the first year given way to more substantive comments on foreign policy? Second, have Mr. Modi’s “legacy” foreign policy issues — areas in which the Prime Minister is personally invested — begun to emerge? And third, do these interventions indicate where India’s foreign policy on new and previously unaddressed themes is headed? All these questions can be answered in the affirmative.

The Prime Minister’s foreign policy interventions during this period reflect efforts to institutionalise the norms his government articulated in its first year. Take, for instance, the principle of “Asian solidarity” that has been a key theme in Mr. Modi’s speeches. In the last six months, he has repeatedly defined this principle through three key markers — the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a cyber-security architecture for the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the settlement of disputes through multilateral rules. On maritime concerns in Asia, Mr. Modi has calibrated the Indian position, without straying too far from the traditional line. The India-Japan Joint Statement of last week referred to the “Indo-Pacific”, officially bringing this strategic phrase into India’s foreign policy lexicon. However, the Prime Minister’s speeches on the subject themselves allude to the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean as distinct regions connected by history and destinies, “however we choose to define them”.

His second-year interventions indicate areas of foreign policy where the Prime Minister’s Office is likely to invest political capital. Cyber-policy is one such theme, reflected in nearly a third of all of his speeches. At intergovernmental venues like ASEAN, BRICS or the G20, Mr. Modi has highlighted the importance of securing “cyber networks” from state and non-state actors. At the East Asia Summit — markedly in the presence of China — the Prime Minister called for “norms of behaviour” in cyberspace. To the private sector, Mr. Modi has flagged “data privacy and security” as a key concern, notably during his visit to Silicon Valley in September. These are norms that he has not broached at home, even in the context of the Digital India initiative.

Themes of trade and energy

Trade partnerships are a major theme in Mr. Modi’s interventions. He has repeatedly called for an “early conclusion” of RCEP, while acknowledging the existence of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. This is not a break from India’s traditional position on the World Trade Organisation’s centrality to international trade.

At the G20 summit in Antalya, he asserted this clearly, warning that regional agreements “should not lead to a fragmentation of the global trading system”.

Renewable energy is another area of priority. His COP21 interventions skew the numbers, but the last six months have seen Mr. Modi consistently talk up India’s renewable energy capacities (175 GW by 2022). The NDA’s position on climate change is closely aligned to that of previous governments: in Paris, the Prime Minister called the principle of common but differentiated responsibility the “bedrock” of any climate treaty, even tipping his hat to the United Progressive Alliance’s “leadership” at the Copenhagen talks in 2009.

These foreign policy themes are closely connected to three initiatives that the Indian government has mooted: the Technology Facilitation Mechanism, a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, and the International Solar Alliance. Figure 2 illustrates their key properties.

What do Mr. Modi’s assertions in his second year signal for India’s foreign policy? With the rhetoric of the first year giving way to substance, there is continuity between the stated views of previous governments and the NDA. Take two contested areas, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and export control regimes. While there has been much hand-wringing at home over the government’s “shift” in IPR policy vis-à-vis its TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) obligations, he asserted that innovation initiatives “should be driven by public purpose, not market incentives, including on intellectual property.” He has consistently highlighted the need for India’s entry into export control regimes — the Missile Control Technology Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group — indicating that India’s special bilateral relationships cannot substitute for inclusive multilateral arrangements.

The prognosis as he consolidates his government’s foreign policy is optimistic, but much will depend on India’s economic performance. Mr. Modi’s interventions suggest that the foreign policy priorities of 21st century India are undergoing a sea change. The NDA’s litmus test will be in ensuring that multilateral regimes can accommodate India’s concerns on cyberspace, IPR and climate change, while balancing requests to move to selective and plurilateral arrangements.

It’s time for art to be political

Indian art has always been well behaved, determinedly steering clear of politics. But if artists create works of political art, will we see their idealism or will we see only sacred cows?

Let’s be honest: aesthetically, Siddhartha Karawal’s ‘Divine Bovine’ is not the most noteworthy bovine in the annals of Indian art. It is, however, perhaps the most manhandled one.

Last month, at the Jaipur Art Summit, Mr. Karawal’s ‘Divine Bovine’, consisting of a cow made of styrofoam and a balloon, made the news. It was floating above the Pink City, minding its own business. Unfortunately, this offended some people. So the cow was hauled away by the local police. Who the offended were and whether they were feeling offended on behalf of cows in general or Mr. Karawal’s styrofoam cow in particular remains unclear. We can only presume they’re the same people who garlanded and worshipped the once-floating, now-grounded, cow once it was in police custody, and that its bovine honour was restored when the worshippers yelled “Gau mata ki jai!”

Deepanjana Pal

As it turned out, all those outraged by ‘Divine Bovine’ were mistaken in their assumption that Mr. Karawal was poking fun at sacred cows. ‘Divine Bovine’ was supposed to be a critical comment on the way we mistreat cows in cities. Mr. Karawal wasn’t challenging anyone with ‘Divine Bovine’. If anything, he and the cow brigade were actually saying the same thing: show the cow some love.

What this ridiculous episode served to underscore is that an artist may create a work of art, but it is the viewer who completes it. If the one who sees it will not or cannot recognise the artist’s intention, then it’s hopeless.

Politically bland

Around the world, contemporary art is used to seeming incomprehensible. To perplex is almost a basic requirement — it’s the first step to ending up as thought-provoking. In addition, most modern and contemporary Indian art is politically bland and determinedly steers clear of politics. Still, the ability to perplex may have saved some of our more talented artists.

Back in 2002, artist Shilpa Gupta peddled little bottles filled with red liquid on the streets and local trains of Mumbai. The bottles were labelled ‘Blame’ and carried this inscription: “Blaming you makes me feel so good, so I blame you for what you cannot control — your religion, your nationality.” The curious performance was her way of responding to the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’. By the time she was ready with her little bottles of ‘Blame’, the Godhra riots had happened and ‘Blame’ felt more pertinent than ever.

In 1994, Bhupen Khakhar painted a watercolour in which a seated man was cradled by another. The one who comforts the seated man is mostly blue-skinned. He has many arms, and in one hand there dangles a garland of marigolds. In another, he holds a lotus that is rising out of a discarded, green shirt. The painting is titled ‘How many hands do I need to declare my love to you?’ It’s an exquisitely gentle and tender painting, glowing with sensual intimacy. However, a homophobe may be disgusted by it and if the person viewing ‘How many hands…’ is itching to manufacture outrage, they can go blue in the face claiming Hinduism has been insulted.

Fortunately, few know of these works of art and fewer have actually seen them, which means both the art and the living artists are safe. Since Indian contemporary art has cultivated a reputation for being elite and its audience is at best described as niche, few see or talk about it. Net result: the chances of being misinterpreted are low. Add to this the deplorably outdated collections of modern art in most Indian museums.

Usually, Indian artists become topics of conversation when a work that almost no one in India has seen goes on to earn a record amount at an international auction. Or if their name is Maqbool Fida Husain.

When Husain was first accused of obscenity and disrespecting Hinduism because he had painted Hindu goddesses as nude figures, it must have sounded like a joke. If traditional temple art is to be believed, these divine ladies aren’t particularly fond of covering up, after all. But the ridiculous turned first into embarrassment, and then miserable shame.

Court cases were filed against the artist. Violent protests, led by right-wing political activists, would mushroom every time his paintings were shown. There were numerous cases of serious vandalism, led by thugs believed to have right-wing political connections. The fear inspired by the anti-Husain brigade was so piercing that one gallery hid the fact that an upcoming exhibition included a portrait of his. It wasn’t even a painting by Husain. It was just a photograph of him.

Husain had his share of supporters, particularly in the art world, but outside, the detractors swarmed public opinion. People said Husain was courting controversy in the hope of staying relevant. None of them paid heed to the fact that he didn’t need religious sectarianism to stay in the news. If anything, the political ‘activists’ who led the charge against Husain were the ones riding on the coat-tails of his fame and reputation.

The Supreme Court would eventually dismiss the cases against Husain in 2011, but by that time, the damage had already been done. The eagerness with which Husain was maligned would make many in the Indian art arena less inclined to wave their aesthetic fists in the right-wing’s face. If media-savvy Husain, with his charm and fame, couldn’t make himself heard, then what chance did others have? Galleries couldn’t afford to have their premises vandalised. Artists couldn’t afford long-standing court cases. The Husain experience suggested that the well behaved world of Indian art needed to add caution to its bag of tricks.

Idealism in art

And yet, despite being studiously apolitical, Indian art has also been unwaveringly idealistic. It was born out of the Progressives’ burning need to develop a distinctively modern, indigenous artistic identity. Since then, the art may be exhibited in cocoon-like galleries. It may be bought and sold by an elite group that is frequently disconnected from average Indians. Still, within the private monologues and debates that charaterise Indian contemporary art, our artists have also questioned social attitudes and criticised the establishment. Only, they did this subtly, with neither them nor their gallerists making any noise about the politics.

Sometimes the protests and idealism would be meshed in artistic imagery, like in the works of Navjot Altaf and Vivan Sundaram. Repeatedly, we’ve seen artists rally together to create collectives like Sahmat, Open Circle and KHOJ, which have offered insightful socio-political commentary. Sometimes the questions would be tangled in the dense but beautiful works made by the likes of CAMP and Desire Machine Collective. Performance artists such as Inder Salim and Tejal Shah have long perplexed many with their strange and fantastic ways of exploring political issues. Recently, 400 artists signed a petition supporting the writers who returned their national awards. Before you ask why they didn’t return anything, check how many Indian artists have been chosen for state honours. It’s a disappointingly tiny number.

Perhaps it is time for Indian artists and art to become less polite and more political. Perhaps it is time to abandon subtlety. But that’s only half the work done. If they voice their protests, will we hear them or the cacophony? If they create a work of political art, will we see their idealism or will we see only sacred cows?